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In this paper we study the optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix in a model in which agents are subject 
to idiosyncratic uninsurable shocks to their labor productivity. We identify two main effects of 
anticipated inflation absent in representative agent frameworks. First, inflation stimulates saving for 
precautionary reasons. Hence, a higher level of anticipated inflation implies a higher capital stock in 
steady state, which translates into higher wages and lower taxes on labor income. This benefits poor, less 
productive agents. Second, inflation acts as a regressive consumption tax, which favors rich and 
productive agents. We calibrate our model economy to the U.S. economy and compute the optimal 
policy mix. We find that, for a utilitarian government, the Friedman rule is optimal even when we allow 
for the presence of heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Although the aggregate welfare 
costs of inflation are small, individual costs and benefits are large. Net winners from inflation are poor, 




En este artículo estudiamos el mix óptimo de política monetaria y fiscal en un modelo en el cual los 
agentes están sujetos a shocks idiosincrásicos y no asegurables a su productividad laboral. Identificamos 
dos efectos principales de la inflación anticipada que están ausentes en modelos bajo el supuesto de 
agente representativo. En primer lugar, la inflación estimula el ahorro por motivo precautorio. Por lo 
tanto, un mayor nivel de inflación anticipada implica un mayor stock de capital de estado estacionario, lo 
cual se traduce en mayores salarios y una menor tasa impositiva al ingreso laboral. Esto beneficia a los 
individuos más pobres y menos productivos. En segundo lugar, la inflación actúa como un impuesto 
regresivo al consumo, lo cual favorece a individuos más ricos y productivos. Calibramos el modelo a la 
economía de EE.UU. y computamos el mix de política óptimo. Encontramos que, para un gobierno 
utilitario, la regla de Friedman es óptima incluso cuando permitimos la presencia de heterogeneidad y 
riesgo idiosincrático no asegurable. A pesar de que los costos agregados de la inflación son bajos, los 
costos o beneficios individuales son altos. Los agentes que ganan con la inflación son aquellos 
individuos pobres y menos productivos, mientras que los que pierden son los más productivos y ricos. 
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The seminal papers by Friedman (1969) and Phelps (1973) opened a wide debate in the last
decades over the issue of the optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy combination in representative
agent frameworks. Friedman argued that optimality required setting the nominal interest rate
to zero, so that the return on money holdings was equated to the return on any other interest-
bearing nominal asset. This is known in the literature as the Friedman rule. Phelps, on the other
hand, indicated that in economies in which lump-sum taxes are not available, the policy maker
should tax all goods, including money. Moreover, since the money demand function is typically
more inelastic than the demand for consumption goods, Phelps concluded that money should be
taxed heavily. This apparent contradiction in the optimal policy prescription motivated some
classical papers such as Chari et al. (1996) and Correia and Teles (1996) among many others.
With some exceptions, the general consensus appears to be that Central Banks should follow
the Friedman rule.
However, by construction all these early contributions overlook issues of heterogeneity and
redistribution. By working with the representative agent assumption, their analysis of optimal
policy focuses only on eﬃciency in distorting relative prices. Therefore, a crucial aspect of
inﬂation is neglected, which is the fact that it does not aﬀect all individuals in the same way.
In this paper we tackle this issue by building a heterogeneous agent model with uninsurable
idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity. We consider the problem of a benevolent government
that has to ﬁnance an exogenous and constant stream of public expenditure. The available
instruments are the inﬂation tax and a tax on labor income and, given that labor supply is
endogenous, both instruments are distortionary. We look for the determination of the optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy mix in such an environment, assuming the government assigns equal
weight to all agents in the economy1.
Since we are interested in identifying and studying the eﬀects of inﬂation over individuals
with diﬀerent income and wealth proﬁles, we need a model in which agents diﬀer in these two
dimensions. In order to assess the eﬀect exerted by inﬂation on the incentives of households
to consume, work and save, and consequently on aggregate long-run capital and output, we
depart from the complete-markets assumption by assuming that agents cannot insure against
their idiosyncratic shocks and are subject to a borrowing constraint. Finally, previous literature
has pointed to the fact that inﬂation can be regarded as a regressive tax on consumption2.W e
introduce this in the analysis by means of a transaction technology alternative to money in which
richer, more productive agents have comparative advantages relative to poorer, less productive
1Examples of other papers that use the same social welfare function are Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Floden
(2001), Floden and Linde (2001) and Heathcote et al. (2008a).
2See Erosa and Ventura (2002).
1ones. In addition, we exacerbate these advantages by assuming easier access to the transaction
technology for more productive agents.
In the setup we propose there are two eﬀects from inﬂation that are not present in representative-
agent frameworks. On the one hand, more productive agents, by having easier access to alterna-
tive transaction technologies, can shelter better from inﬂation. This shifts the burden of taxation
from richer, more productive agents to poorer households, thus beneﬁting the former group. If
the planner cares suﬃciently for poor agents, this eﬀect goes in favor of the Friedman rule.
On the other hand, in economies in which households cannot insure against their idiosyncratic
shocks, inﬂation ampliﬁes the motive for precautionary savings. When the bad shock hits and
the individual is very poor (i.e., is close to hitting the borrowing constraint) the inﬂation tax re-
duces consumption and leisure and, consequently, utility, thus creating an incentive to save. The
higher savings level translates into higher capital in steady state, higher wages and lower labor
tax rates. By this means, a higher level of inﬂation increases welfare of poor, low productivity
households that rely almost entirely on labor income. When the government cares about poor
households, this eﬀect goes against the Friedman rule. Considering these two eﬀects jointly, we
see that they operate in opposite directions. Deviating from the Friedman rule assures poor
agents a higher labor income, while middle-class and rich agents have to endure lower levels of
capital income. Nevertheless, they are beneﬁted by a reduction in their tax burden associated
to the increase in the inﬂation tax which, as explained before, is a regressive tax.
There is a distortion associated to inﬂation that is already present in environments with a
representative agent, which is related to the uniform taxation argument from the public ﬁnance
literature. When consumption goods can be bought either with cash or with an alternative
transaction technology, deviating from the Friedman rule implies taxing the goods bought with
cash more than the rest of the goods. If all goods enter in the utility function of the household
in identical manner, this is not eﬃcient3.
From the previous discussion it can be concluded that, in economies with uninsurable id-
iosyncratic uncertainty and heterogeneous agents, the determination of the optimal monetary
and ﬁscal policy mix remains a quantitative question. In order to provide a suitable answer,
we calibrate the model economy to match some selected statistics of the U.S. economy. Some
key targets are the correlation between money and asset holdings, the fraction of consumption
expenditures made with cash and the Gini coeﬃcient of the asset distribution. We deﬁne the
benchmark economy to be one that displays an annual rate of inﬂation of 2%4.
Given our parameterization we ﬁnd that for a utilitarian planner5 t h eF r i e d m a nr u l ei s
3To be more precise, for this argument to hold the utility function has to be separable in consumption and
leisure and the subutility over consumption goods has to be homothetic.
4This is a reasonable annual inﬂation target for the Fed.
5A utilitarian planner is one that assigns equal weights to all households in the computation of the social
welfare function.
2optimal despite the introduction of heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. The afore-
mentioned beneﬁcial eﬀects of inﬂation on welfare are not suﬃciently large, from a quantitative
point of view, to oﬀset its detrimental eﬀects. Thus it is optimal to set the nominal interest rate
equal to zero. Next, we perform a welfare analysis comparing the benchmark economy to an
economy in which the Friedman rule is implemented. We ﬁnd that the aggregate welfare gains of
switching from the benchmark policy regime to the optimal one are rather small. The percent of
life-time consumption that agents in the benchmark economy are prepared to give up to get the
policy change is 0.51%. Following Floden (2001) we decompose these welfare gains into gains
from increased levels of consumption, reduced uncertainty and reduced inequality. We ﬁnd that
most of the gains are due to increased levels of consumption and, to a lesser extent, to reduced
uncertainty.
Despite these seemingly small aggregate welfare gains, the individual welfare gains and loses
can be very large. A surprising ﬁnding is that poor, less productive agents are net losers from
the policy change6. When inﬂation decreases, so does aggregate capital and, with it, wages.
This eﬀect can be very harmful for these agents: we ﬁnd that, for the poorest individual,
consumption should decrease permanently by about 4% in the benchmark economy for him
to be indiﬀerent between living in any of the two worlds proposed. On the contrary, middle-
class and rich individuals are net winners from the change in regime. Rich, low- productivity
households should obtain a permanent increase in consumption of around 4% to be indiﬀerent
between the two regimes. These large individual eﬀects cancel out almost completely in the
aggregate, thus yielding the small overall eﬀects described before.
Although this paper is not the ﬁrst one to look at inﬂation in heterogeneous-agent envi-
ronments, it is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst one that identiﬁes in a uniﬁed framework diﬀerent
eﬀects of inﬂation that had been described separately and derives the optimal policy within such
framework.
The contributions of Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Algan and Ragot (2006) study the
redistributive aspects of inﬂation. Both papers point out diﬀerent mechanisms through which
inﬂation aﬀects the agents’ welfare depending on their level of wealth and labor productivity,
namely, that inﬂation acts as a regressive tax on consumption and that it stimulates savings.
They reach contradictory conclusions: while the former states that inﬂation is relatively more
harmful to poorer households, the latter claims that the higher level of capital in steady state
translates into higher wages and higher welfare for poor, labor-income dependent individuals.
Neither of these papers addresses the issue of inﬂation from a normative point of view.
There are a number of papers that deal with the determination of the optimal inﬂation rate
when taking into account issues of heterogeneity. Akyol (2004) studies an endowment economy
in which only high productivity households hold money in equilibrium. Seigniorage revenues can
6See Algan and Ragot (2006) for a similar result.
3be used to ﬁnance redistributive (anonymous) transfers and interest payments on government
debt. Therefore, the main role of inﬂation is to redistribute resources from agents with high
endowment shocks to those holding bonds, which improves risk-sharing. The author ﬁnds that
the optimal inﬂation rate is of about 10%. Although in this paper not all high-productivity
agents are also rich, the correlation between wealth and productivity is very high. Then, the
idea that richer agents are the ones holding money in equilibrium is at odds with some stylized
facts on transactions and cash holdings reported in Erosa and Ventura (2002), which indicate
the opposite. In this paper, we construct the model such that its predictions in terms of cash
holdings and proportion of purchases made with cash are in line with what the data suggests.
Albanesi (2005) and Bhattacharya et al. (2007) propose frameworks in which agents are ex-
ante heterogeneous and there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty. In particular, they assume there
are two types of households in the economy. While in Albanesi (2005), agents of diﬀerent types
have diﬀerent labor productivities, Bhattacharya et al. (2007) assume that agents diﬀer in the
marginal utility they derive from real money balances. Albanesi (2005) ﬁnds that it may be
optimal to depart from the Friedman rule, depending on the weight that the government assigns
to each type of agent. On the other hand, Bhattacharya et al. (2007) conclude that, because
inﬂation redistributes resources from one type of agent to the other, both types may beneﬁt if
the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. Both papers abstract from capital, but given
the lack of idiosyncratic uninsurable risk, monetary policy would not aﬀect the long-run capital
stock. This is a crucial element that we include in our analysis.
Some papers in the search literature study the implications of anticipated inﬂation, as for
example Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) and Bhattacharya et al. (2005). These studies view mone-
tary policy as a mechanism to induce agents to exert the correct amount of search eﬀort. Search
eﬀort is related to the quantity of output produced and, consequently, welfare. The scope of
this literature is substantially diﬀerent from ours. Although we do regard money as a means of
payment, our interest in inﬂation is related to the fact that it distorts the consumption, leisure
and savings decisions. Thus, we do not address in detail how money facilitates transactions and
to what extent monetary policy can enhance this role but, rather, focus on the eﬀects of money
growth on allocations.
Finally, da Costa and Werning (2008) propose a framework in which agents have private
information on their labor productivity. The analysis abstracts from idiosyncratic risk by as-
suming that diﬀerences in productivity are permanent. Moreover, agents do not hold capital.
The authors assume that money and work eﬀort are complements, so that the demand for money,
conditional on the expenditure of goods, weakly increases with the amount of work eﬀort. They
ﬁnd that the Friedman rule is optimal if labor income is positively taxed. The reason for this re-
sult is that deviating from the Friedman rule does not aid the planner in designing a mechanism
to ensure that individuals do not underreport their productivity, i.e., it does not help relaxing
4the incentive-compatibility constraints in the planner’s problem. Although this study and ours
reach similar conclusions in terms of policy prescription, the reasons behind this result are very
diﬀerent in the two setups. We assume the government cannot observe an agent’s productivity
by restricting the set of ﬁscal instruments to an anonymous tax on labor, so in our framework
agents do not have incentives to underreport by construction. Instead, we focus on the eﬀects
of inﬂation on households that diﬀer in wealth as well as labor productivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In section
3 we discuss the calibration strategy. Section 4 contains a description of the diﬀerent eﬀects
operating in the model and shows the results in terms of optimal policy. In section 5 we perform
the welfare analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes and discusses lines for future research.
2 The model
The model is close to Erosa and Ventura (2002) but with two important diﬀerences. First, in
our model the labor supply is endogenous. Second, we introduce the idea that more productive
agents have easier access to transaction technologies alternative to the use of cash, with respect
to less productive agents. These two modiﬁcations to the basic setup alter completely the
analysis of the eﬀects of inﬂation over diﬀerent population sectors. We defer the discussion of
these eﬀects until the next section.
Households face idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks, that we denote by εt. There is no
aggregate uncertainty. Consequently, the economy is at its steady state and all aggregate real
variables remain constant. For simplicity, we will omit the time subscript from aggregate real
variables.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass 1 of ex-ante identical and inﬁnitely lived
households. Households are endowed with one unit of time each period and derive utility from
consumption of ﬁnal goods and leisure.
Markets are incomplete, in the sense that it is not possible to trade bonds which payoﬀs
are contingent on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. Moreover, we assume that agents
cannot borrow. Consequently, agents can only save by holding one-period riskless assets and
money. We denote by Wt the total nominal wealth an individual has in period t,w h e r eWt is
the sum of total money holdings Mt and assets At.
Agents consume a continuum of ﬁnal goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. We assume that the
consumption aggregator, denoted by c, takes the form c =i n f j{c(j)}7. The choice of the
7We choose this aggregator for simplicity reasons only. Working with a more general aggregator such as a
Dixit-Stigliz aggregator does not alter our results qualitatively.
5aggregator implies that agents consume an equal amount of each good j, therefore
c = c(j)=c(m) ∀j,m ∈ [0,1]
Agents choose optimally whether to buy ﬁnal goods with cash or with a costly transaction
technology, which we will call credit. In order to buy an amount c of good j with credit, the
consumer must purchase γ(j) units of ﬁnancial services.
Following Lucas and Stokey (1983), we assume that the ﬁnancial market closes ﬁrst and the
goods market follows. More speciﬁcally, at the beginning of period t, after observing the current
shock εt, agents adjust their portfolio compositions by trading money and assets in a centralized
securities market and pay the credit obligations that they contracted in the previous period. In
this sense, the transaction technology we consider does not allow households to transfer liabilities
from one period to the other. Instead, it represents a way in which consumers can transform
their interest-bearing assets into a means of payment that is not subject to the inﬂation tax.
The gross nominal return of a one-period bond At is the nominal interest rate R.N o t i c e
that the gross nominal return of money is 1, so money is (weakly) dominated in rate of return
by assets. Nevertheless, households value money because it provides liquidity services to buy
consumption goods.
After trade in the securities market has taken place, the goods market opens. At this stage,
households buy consumption goods with money or credit, decide how much to work and save
a fraction of their total income in the form of nominal wealth Wt+1 that they will carry to the
next period to transform it into assets and money in the securities market. Household i’s budget









t +( 1− τl)ωpt(1 − li
t)εi
t (1)
where pt is the unitary price of the ﬁnal good, qt is the price of a unit of ﬁnancial services,
  zi
t
0 γi(j)dj is the total amount of credit bought, ω is the real wage for one eﬃciency unit of
labor, li
t is time devoted to leisure and τl is an anonymous linear tax on labor income.
As mentioned before, households need either cash or credit in order to buy consumption
goods. Agents choose which goods they will buy with credit and which with cash, and zi
t ∈ [0,1]
stands for the fraction of goods bought with credit by household i8. Since all goods that are not
bought with credit need to be paid with money, household i faces the following cash-in-advance





8To be more precise, agents will buy goods indexed from 0 to z
i
t with credit and the rest of the goods (from
z
i
t to index 1) with cash.
6Notice that, if R>1, money is strictly dominated in rate of return by assets and, conse-
quently, constraint (2) will always be binding because agents can adjust their money holdings
after the idiosyncratic shock is observed.

























In the appendix we show the optimality conditions associated to this problem.
2.2 Firms
There are two types of competitive ﬁrms in this economy: ﬁrms that produce consumption goods
and ﬁnancial ﬁrms that produce transaction services. We assume that all markets are perfectly
competitive and, in consequence, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
2.2.1 Consumption goods sector
Let K denote the aggregate capital stock and Lg aggregate labor in eﬃciency units employed
in the goods sector. Then the production technology in the consumption goods sector can be
written as
yt = F(K,Lg)
where F(·) is a neoclassical production function9. Optimality conditions of the ﬁrm are




where r is the before-tax real return on capital and δ is the depreciation rate.
9We assume that the production function is identical for any type of consumption good i ∈ [0,1] so the relative
price of any two types of goods i and j is 1 ∀i,j.



















Figure 1: Marginal cost of credit γ(j)f o rε1 <ε 2
2.2.2 Financial services sector
We assume that a household with labor productivity εi
t can acquire a fraction of goods ˜ zi
t with
credit at zero marginal cost, and that ˜ zi
t depends on the potential labor income of an agent.
More speciﬁcally, ˜ zi
t = f(εi





> 0. In words, this assumption means that the fraction of
goods that can be purchased with credit at zero marginal cost increases with the productivity
of an agent. Then, more productive agents have an advantage in the use of credit with respect
to less productive ones. Figure 1 shows the marginal cost of credit for goods i ∈ [0,1] for agents
n and m with εn
t >ε m
t .
The assumption that ˜ zi
t depends positively on the labor productivity of agent i is a shortcut
to reﬂect the better access to commercial credit markets that high-income, rich households enjoy
when compared to poor, low-income ones. Think of a similar scenario to the one proposed here,
but now at the beginning of each period, after observing her individual shock, household i
decides whether to repay her credit obligations contracted in the last period. If the household
chooses not to repay she is excluded from the credit market for the next period, otherwise it can
apply for a new credit line. The household will decide to pay the credit obligations contracted in
period t−1 only if the value of the credit in t is higher or equal than what she owes from t−1.
O b v i o u s l y ,t h ea m o u n to fc r e d i ti nt is determined by the wealth and the labor productivity
of the agent in t.I nt − 1, when the agent applies for the loan, the ﬁnancial services ﬁrm will
charge an interest rate that reﬂects the risk that the agent defaults in the next period. This
risk will be decreasing in wealth and productivity since richer, more productive agents are more
likely to use credit more intensely in the next period.
With this argument in mind, it is natural to think that the cost of credit depends positively
8on the earnings capacity of an individual. A natural way to capture this feature in the model is
through ˜ zi
t. Of course, given our previous discussion, one would naturally think that ˜ zi
t should
depend on Wi
t as well. Nevertheless, adding this dependence complicates the numerical solution
of the model and, since εi
t and Wi
t are highly correlated anyway, it presumably does not change
the results substantially.
For goods j ∈ [˜ zi
t,1] the nominal marginal cost of the use of credit is qtγi(j). The total cost
of credit for agent i with productivity εi
t that buys a fraction zi
t > ˜ zi











Following Erosa and Ventura (2002), the function γ(i) is strictly increasing in i for i>˜ zt
and satisﬁes limi→1γ(i)=∞10. This assumption guarantees that some goods will be purchased
with cash so that there is a well-deﬁned demand for money.
The technology to produce transaction services requires one unit of labor (in eﬃciency units)
per unit of service produced. We denote by Lc the amount of labor in eﬃciency units employed
in the production of transaction services:





where λ is the distribution of agents in the economy. Firms in the sector charge the price
qt per unit of credit sold. Competition ensures that ﬁrms make zero proﬁts and set their prices
such that ωpt = qt
11.
2.3 Government
The government has to ﬁnance an exogenous stream of public spending through distortionary
taxes on aggregate labor income and asset returns and through seigniorage revenues. The
nominal budget constraint of the government is
ptg + Mt = τlωptL + τkrptK + Mt+1 (5)
where L is total aggregate labor in eﬃciency units L = Lg + Lc and τk is the tax rate on
asset returns.
10The meaning and role of ˜ zt will be analyzed in detail later.








In our economy, each agent is characterized by the pair (wt,ε t)w h e r ewt is wealth in real
terms. Let W ≡ [0, ¯ w] be the compact set of all possible wealth holdings where ¯ w is an upper
bound on wealth and the lower bound is determined by the no borrowing condition12.L e t
E ≡{ ε1,ε 2,...,εn} be the set of all possible realizations of the labor productivity shock εt.T h e
shock follows a Markov process with transition probabilities π(ε ,ε)=P r ( εt+1 = ε |εt = ε).
Deﬁne the state space S as the cartesian product S = W ×E with Borel σ-algebra B and typical
subset S =( W×E ). The space (S,B) is a measurable space, and for any set S∈Bλ(S)i s






where Q((w,ε),W×E ) is the probability that an individual with current state (w,ε)i si n




I{w (w,ε) ∈W } π(ε ,ε)
Here I(·) is the indicator function and w (w,ε) is the optimal savings policy of an individual
in state (w,ε).
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium is given by functions {gc,gl,gz,gw
,ga,L g,L c},ap r i c e
system {pt,ω,q t,r}∞
t=0 and government policies {τl,τk,R,M t}∞
t=0 such that
1. Given prices and government policies, the allocations solve the household’s problem.
2. r = FK(K,Lg) − δ, ω = FLg(K,Lg)
3. Given the allocations and price system, the government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
12Notice that the no borrowing condition means that
at ≥ 0( 6 )
Nevertheless, since wt = at + mt and at and mt are decision variables of the agent, only by imposing wt ≥ 0
we make sure that condition (6) is satisﬁed always.
104. Markets clear:
 
gcdλ + g + δK = F(Lg,K)
   zt
˜ zt
γ(j)djdλ = Lc












The government is benevolent and seeks to set taxes and seigniorage so as to maximize a so-
cial welfare function. We deﬁne the objective function in the maximization problem of the





where V ({cs,l s}∞
s=t)=
 ∞
s=t βs−tu(cs,l s) is life-time utility at time t. A sw ec a ns e ei n
expression (7), all households receive an equal weight for the computation of social welfare. A
standard interpretation for this criterion is that the planner maximizes welfare under the veil of
ignorance; that is, ex-ante welfare for a hypothetical household before knowing in which point
of the distribution she is.











Competitive equilibrium (equations (20) - (24))
ptg + Mt = τlωptL + τkrptK + Mt+1
113 Eﬀects of inﬂation
It is well known that in representative-agent frameworks the Friedman rule is the optimal policy
recommendation for a wide variety of models (see Chari et al. (1996)). This result extends to our
model economy if we shut down heterogeneity among households. In the case in which εi
t = ε ∀i
a benevolent planner sets R = 1. The intuition behind this result lies in the uniform commodity
taxation argument from the public ﬁnance literature. Notice that in our framework goods bought
with cash and with credit enter the utility function in identical manner13. Therefore, the tax
on labor income implicitly taxes all goods, whether bought with cash or with an alternative
transaction technology, at an identical rate. Setting R>1 entails taxing more those goods
bought with cash, which is not eﬃcient. Given the representative-agent assumption, in the
model we are describing there are no issues of redistribution or self-insurance. Moreover, the
capital-labor ratio is pinned down by the intertemporal discount factor β, so inﬂation does not
aﬀect the return on capital or the wage rate. Thus, eﬃciency in the taxation of diﬀerent goods
is the only aspect that the planner should take into account when designing the optimal policy
plan.
When we introduce idiosyncratic uninsurable risk the analysis changes substantially. Now
inﬂation has eﬀects over the level of capital in steady state. In addition, due to the presence of
an alternative transaction technology like the one have introduced, inﬂation acts as a regressive
tax on consumption. We proceed to describe these eﬀects in detail. We argue that, once these
eﬀects are taken into consideration, the determination of the optimal policy mix remains an
open question that needs a quantitative answer.
3.1 Inﬂation as a regressive tax on consumption
As described by Erosa and Ventura (2002), inﬂation can act as a regressive consumption tax
when, in a heterogeneous agent setup such as ours, we allow agents to substitute cash by an
alternative transaction technology that displays economies of scale. For the moment we abstract
from the presence of idiosyncratic risk, since all the analysis holds by allowing for heterogeneity
in labor productivities only.
Without loss of generality, assume that an agent’s productivity εi is constant ∀t, εi ∈ E =
[ε1,ε 2]w i t hε1 <ε 2 and there is an equal mass of each type of agent in the population14.
Furthermore, assume for simplicity that initial wealth holdings w1
0 and w2
0 are such that the
economy is in steady state from t = 0 onwards. Then, optimality for agent i requires that
13The argument that follows holds always that utility is separable in consumption and leisure, and the utility
over consumption goods is homothetic, see Chari et al. (1996) for a formal proof in a similar model.





The second term on the right hand side of the previous expression is the unitary cost of credit
for the threshold good zi. It is clear from expression (8) and from the functional speciﬁcation
of the transaction technology (11) that this unitary cost decreases when the volume transacted
increases. Thus, the transaction technology displays economies of scale.
Assume for now that ˜ zi =0f o ri =1 ,2. From (8) it is immediate to see that z1 = z2 =0
when R = 1, i.e, when the planner follows the Friedman rule both types of agents buy all
consumption goods using cash, since holding cash does not bring about any opportunity cost.
On the contrary, if R>1, z2 >z 1 > 0, given that c2 >c 1 because agent 2 enjoys a higher labor
income and, therefore, a higher level of consumption15. Then it follows that the more productive
agents use the credit technology more intensely. This feature of the model is consistent with the
evidence on transaction patterns and portfolio holdings that Erosa and Ventura (2002) report
in their paper, which can be summarized in three main facts: high income individuals buy a
smaller fraction of their consumption with cash, the fraction of wealth in the form of liquid
assets held by a household decreases with her wealth and income and, ﬁnally, a non-negligible
fraction of households does not own a credit card.
Due to the presence of economies of scale in the transaction technology, buying goods with
credit is relatively more expensive for less productive agents. Because these agents buy a larger
fraction of goods with cash, they need to hold a relatively larger fraction of their income in liquid
assets. It is in this sense that inﬂation acts as a regressive tax on consumption, since setting
R>1 corresponds to taxing low-income individuals more.
If ˜ z2 > ˜ z1 this asymmetric eﬀect of the inﬂation tax is exacerbated. As we discussed in section
2.2.2, the introduction of ˜ zi is a shortcut to model diﬀerences in the access to commercial credit
markets that high-income, rich households enjoy when compared to poor, low-income ones. The
regressive nature of the inﬂation tax implies that for high productivity households it is optimal
to set a gross nominal interest rate higher than 1, since in this way the burden of taxation is
shifted to poor, unproductive individuals. To see the intuition behind this statement, think of
the limit case in which ˜ z2 = 1. In this case the inﬂation tax does not aﬀect agents of type 2 in
any way, so they would want the government to set it as high as necessary to ﬁnance completely
its expenditure from seigniorage revenue.
In the appendix we show (numerically) that, in the current setup, a benevolent government
(a Ramsey planner) that assigns a suﬃciently high Pareto weight on type 2 agents would ﬁnd
it optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule and set R>1.




0. Here we are implicitly
making the assumption that the more productive agent is at least as rich as the less productive one.
133.2 Inﬂation as a motive for precautionary savings
The eﬀect described in the previous section is at work due to the assumption of heterogeneity
and the transaction technology we have speciﬁed, but it does not depend on the presence of
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. In this section we argue that inﬂation accentuates such risk and
that, consequently, households save more when inﬂation is high.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which there is no uncertainty (aggregate or idiosyncratic). Then
the capital/labor ratio is determined in steady state by the discount factor β and is completely
independent of the inﬂation rate. In this sense inﬂation is neutral and it does not aﬀect the
wage rate or the real interest rate in steady state. This is also true if we allow for idiosyncratic
uncertainty but assume that households can trade a complete set of Arrow securities contingent
on the realization of the labor productivity shock. It is easy to show that in this case agents
can do full risk sharing and, if there is no aggregate uncertainty and utility is separable in
consumption and leisure, enjoy a constant level of consumption independently of their current
labor productivity. As in the case with no uncertainty, β determines the aggregate capital-labor
ratio, ω and r16.
In models with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints, agents save not only to smooth
consumption by transferring resources from one period to the other, but also to insure themselves
against bad realizations of the shock that may push them close to the borrowing constraint
and force them to consume very little. The absence of complete markets and the presence
of borrowing constraints lead agents to save for precautionary reasons17. Moreover, the more
uncertain future income (and consumption) becomes, the stronger the motive for precautionary
savings. The increase in savings translates into an increase in the capital stock in steady state,
with the consequent decrease in the real interest rate and increase in the wage rate.
In the economy we have described in previous sections, a higher level of steady state inﬂation
implies that future consumption is more uncertain and, consequently, reinforces the incentives to
save. To see this, consider the no-borrowing constraint of household i,w h i c hs a y st h a tAi
t ≥ 0.
As shown in the appendix, this constraint can be re-written as:
ci
t(1 − zi
t)(1 + π) ≤ wi
t (9)
where π is the inﬂation rate. Consider a steady state with πA, in which household i at time
t hits the constraint:
16We have abstracted from the possibility that there is aggregate uncertainty. In this case, if there are incomplete
markets with respect to the aggregate shock, inﬂation can have an active role as a mechanism to complete the
markets. See Chari et al. (1991) for a discussion.
17When the marginal utility is convex, i.e., utility displays a positive third derivative, independently of the
presence of borrowing constraints, agents save because of prudence.
14c
i,A
t (1 − z
i,A
t )(1 + πA)=w
i,A
t
If inﬂation were higher, say πB >π A, to sustain the same level of consumption c
i,A
t and the
same fraction of goods bought with credit zi,A,h o u s e h o l di would need to have a higher level of
wealth in order to satisfy constraint (9). Similarly, for a household i that has wealth holdings
w
i,A









combination of both. Raising zi
t entails working more to be able to pay for the higher credit
expenses; since the intratemporal optimality condition (23) has to be satisﬁed, consumption




t . This means that the higher level of
inﬂation πB renders consumption more uncertain.
The previous discussion points out to the fact that inﬂation raises the incentives to save
and, as a consequence, the level of steady- state capital. Thus, an economy with higher inﬂation
displays a lower real interest rate and higher wages. Also, because the budget constraint of
the government (5) has to be satisﬁed, the higher seigniorage revenue calls for a decrease in
τl. Poor agents, who rely almost entirely on their labor income and whose marginal utilities of
consumption and leisure are very large, ﬁnd this beneﬁcial because a small increase in disposable
income translates into a sizeable increase in utility. On the other hand, middle-class and rich
households are harmed by the reduction in their capital income derived from the lower real
interest rate.
4 Calibration and functional speciﬁcation
The model described here cannot be solved analytically. Consequently, we need to resort to
numerical techniques to obtain a solution. In what follows, we describe the calibration strategy
and functional speciﬁcation we work with.
The length of the model period is one year. We deﬁne the benchmark steady state as one in
which the government sets its policy in accordance with what is observed for the U.S economy. In
particular, we set inﬂation to be 2% annually in the benchmark steady state. Next, we select the
model parameters so that in the benchmark steady state equilibrium the model economy matches
some selected features of the U.S data. While some of the parameters can be set externally,
others are estimated within the model and require solving for equilibrium allocations18.W e
summarize the values of externally set and internally calibrated parameters in Tables 4.1.2 and
4.2.1, as well as the targets they are related to and the values for the targets obtained from the
model. Notice that, in the case of internally determined parameters, all parameters aﬀect all
18The distinction between externally set and internally calibrated parameters corresponds to Heathcote et al.
(2008b).
15calibration targets. Nevertheless, since usually each parameter aﬀects more directly only one
target, we report in the table the target that it is more related to19.
4.1 Parameters set exogenously
4.1.1 Preferences












This speciﬁcation is convenient because the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is equal to θ1.
We set θ1 =0 .59, which is in line with Domeij and Flod´ en (2006) estimates20. It is common to
ﬁnd in the literature that σ ∈ [1,2], so we set σ =1 .521.
4.1.2 Technology
Consumption goods sector: The technology for the production of consumption goods is a
standard Cobb-Douglas function
y = KαLg1−α
α is set such that the labor income share of GDP, wL/Y =1− α =0 .64.
Transaction services sector: We adopt the following credit technology, which is a modiﬁed
version of what Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Albanesi (2005) use:
γi(j)=γ0
 





γ0 and γ1 are internally calibrated, as explained in section 4.2.1.
As was explained before, ˜ zi
t depends on the labor productivity of an agent, εi
t. A proposed
function for ˜ zi
t is
˜ zi
t = μ0 + μ1
 
(1 − ¯ l)ωεi
t
 
19As Pijoan-Mas (2006) explains, this calibration strategy can be seen as an exactly identiﬁed simulated method
of moments estimation.
20These authors claim that previous estimates of the labor-supply elasticity are inconsistent with incomplete
market models because borrowing constraints are not considered in the analysis, in particular, they are downward-
biased.
21Examples of papers that use these values are Erosa and Ventura (2002), Campanale (2007), Casta˜ neda et al.
(2003) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004), among many others.









where (1 − ¯ l) are average hours worked, which we set to be 1/3 of disposable time. No-
tice that we are making ˜ zi
t depend on potential gross labor income rather than on actual labor
income. This simpliﬁes greatly the analysis. If ˜ zi
t depended on current labor income and/or
wealth wt, then the agent would take into account that by changing her labor/leisure and con-
sumption/savings decisions, she would be aﬀecting the cost of credit she faces. This interaction
complicates the task of obtaining the allocations ct, lt, zt and wt+1 from the optimality conditions
of the household22. We leave this exercise for future research.
μ0 and μ1 are determined so that agents with the lowest productivity level possible have
˜ zi
t = 0 while agents with the highest productivity level have ˜ zi
t =0 .2 in the benchmark parame-
terization.
4.1.3 Government
We adopt a very standard parameterization for ﬁscal variables. Usually it is accepted that the
ratio of government expenditure over GDP lies in the interval [0.19,0.22]23.W e s e t G/Y =
0.2. To make our study comparable to other papers in the optimal ﬁscal policy literature, we
introduce a tax on asset returns τk. Nevertheless, we assume it is ﬁxed at a value of 0.397,
which is in line with Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Floden and Linde (2001). The reason to
introduce this tax is that, otherwise, almost all public revenues would have to come from labor
income taxation, causing the distortion on the labor/leisure decision to be very large. Finally,
we set inﬂation to be 0.02 in the benchmark parameterization.
22In the Appendix we describe in detail the numerical algorithm used to solve the model.
23Some studies that use values in this range are Erosa and Ventura (2002), Campanale (2007) and Floden and
Linde (2001).
17Table 2: Parameters set endogenously
Parameter Value Target (data) Model
θ0 25
 
(1 − l)dλ =0 .33 0.34
β 0.952 K/Y=3 2.99







tdλ =0 .80 . 7 9
ε1 0.3547 Gini K = 0.78 0.77
ε2 0.9428 Fraction of wealth of Q1+Q2 = 0.0335 0.08
α 0.36 ωL/Y = 0.64 0.64
δ 0.083 I/Y=0.25 0.25
p 0.921 ρ=0.92 0.92
q 0.9886 σ  =0 .21 0.21
4.2 Internally calibrated parameters
4.2.1 Preferences and technology
We need to pin down θ0 from the utility function (10), the discount factor β, the depreciation
rate δ and the two parameters γ0 and γ1 from the credit technology (11). The targets we choose
are the following: the average fraction of disposable time devoted to work should be 1/324,
the capital to output ratio should be K/Y =3 25, the investment to output ratio should be
I/Y =0 .25, the correlation between money and asset holdings should be corr(m,a)=0 .1626





24See Pijoan-Mas (2006) and Casta˜ neda et al. (2003) for a similar choice.
25Pijoan-Mas (2006), Campanale (2007), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Casta˜ neda et al. (2003) among others.
26The correlation between money and asset holdings is computed using the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Since cash holdings are not reported in the survey, we use the amount of money held in checking accounts as a
proxy for money holdings. All the remaining sources of net worth are considered to be assets at.
27Erosa and Ventura (2002) report that 80% of transactions are made with cash (M1). Since we do not have
a measure of the number of transactions in our model, we use as a proxy the value of transactions. Similarly,
Algan and Ragot (2006) report that M1/C   0.78 for the 1960-2000 period. We use a value of 0.8 which is in
the middle of these two.
184.2.2 Labor productivity process
Our main aim is to deﬁne what the optimal mix of ﬁscal and monetary policy should be in the
presence of idiosyncratic uninsurable risk. As we will see in the following sections, individuals
with diﬀerent levels of wealth and labor income are aﬀected diﬀerently by diﬀerent policies.
Moreover, the optimal policy prescription depends crucially on the presence and the extent in
which agents are exposed to the idiosyncratic shock. Consequently, the deﬁnition of the process
for the labor productivity shock εt is critical to the analysis.
We follow the approach of Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and set two goals that our spec-
iﬁcation of the shock should accomplish. The ﬁrst goal is that the persistence and variance
of earnings shocks in the model are consistent with empirical estimates from panel data. The
second is that in equilibrium the model yields a distribution of households across wealth that
resembles in some aspects the distribution observed in the US.
We assume that the labor productivity process can display only three values, i.e., E =
{ε1,ε 2,ε 3} where ε1 <ε 2 <ε 3. The transition probability matrix corresponding to the shock
adds 6 free parameters28 which, added to the three productivity levels, sum up to 9 parameters
that need to be pinned down.
In order to restrict the number of free parameters available for calibration, we assume the
following: households cannot jump directly from the lowest productivity state to the highest
one and viceversa, and they face equal probability of going from the medium productivity state















Finally, we impose average productivity in the economy to be equal to 1. This leaves us with
4 free parameters to pin down.
As mentioned before, our ﬁrst goal is to have a process that replicates the persistence and
variance of earnings shocks present in panel data. As described in Floden (2001) and Pijoan-
Mas (2006), wages (in logs) can be decomposed into two components. The ﬁrst component,
which we call η, is constant for a given individual and represents ability, education and all
other elements that inﬂuence wages and can be depicted as ﬁxed idiosyncratic characteristics
of an agent. The second component, νt, is a stochastic individual component meant to capture
idiosyncratic uncertainty in the earnings process. It basically reﬂects changes in the employment
28Since the shock is a 3-state Markov chain, the transition probability matrix is a 3-by-3 matrix so it has 9
values to be determined. Nevertheless, the rows of the matrix have to add up to one, therefore the number of free
parameters is 6.








status of each agent, job changes to positions that match better or worse the individual’s ability,
health shocks that aﬀect productivity, etc. This last component corresponds to the notion of
(log of) ε in our model.







and found ρν =0 .92 and σζ =0 .21. We use these as the targets for the persistence and
variance of our productivity shock29.
Our second goal is to have realistic heterogeneity in terms of wealth in equilibrium. As
a consequence, we set as targets the Gini coeﬃcient of the asset (total wealth minus money
holdings) distribution, which is approximately 0.78 according to 2004 SCF data, and the fraction
of total wealth in the hands of the two poorest quintiles of population, which is about 3.35%
using the same data. The last target is important because, a priori, inﬂation is likely to aﬀect
more poorer agents that consume a relatively much larger fraction of their income than richer
ones and thus need to have most (if not all) of their wealth in the form of money.
5 Results
5.1 Optimal policy
In the previous sections we have discussed the role that the inﬂation tax has as a regressive tax on
consumption and as an incentive for capital accumulation. The two eﬀects aﬀect asymmetrically
diﬀerent sectors of the population: while the former beneﬁts richer, more productive agents, the
latter increases welfare of the poor, unproductive ones.
29Diﬀerent studies suggest that ρ
ν should belong to the [0.88,0.96] interval, while σζ should be between 0.12
and 0.25. See Domeij and Heathcote (2004) for references.






















































































Having exposed all the mechanisms by which inﬂation aﬀects the agents in our economy, it
should be clear by now that the determination of the optimal policy mix is a question that does
not have an immediate answer. There are a variety of eﬀects operating simultaneously, aﬀecting
diﬀerent agents in contradictory ways. The only way to provide an answer is to ﬁnd the optimal
policy numerically, once we have a reasonably calibrated model economy.
The main result of our analysis is the following:
Result 1. For a utilitarian social welfare function, that is, one that assigns equal weight to all
individuals, the Friedman rule is optimal and the government sets R =1 .
The previous result suggests that, despite the fact that some agents win with relatively
high levels of inﬂation (compared to the one that arises when R = 1), the eﬃciency motive
associated to uniform taxation dominates and the optimal policy prescription is the Friedman
rule. Therefore, the optimality of the Friedman rule is not only robust to the introduction
of distortionary taxation, as explained by Chari et al. (1996), but also to considerations of
heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, as we have shown here.
5.2 Steady state comparison
Table 3 shows some statistics for the benchmark and the optimal policy steady states, respec-
tively. From the table we see that in the optimal policy steady state the capital to labor ratio is










































































smaller than in the benchmark economy, thus the lower real interest rate and higher wage rate.
This is a direct consequence of the fact that inﬂation reinforces the motive for precautionary
savings, as discussed in the previous section. The lower wage rate, lower savings and lower
seigniorage revenue force the government to increase the tax rate on labor income in order to
balance its budget. Therefore τl is higher in the optimal policy economy.
Figures 2 and 3 show consumption and leisure policy functions in the benchmark economy
and in the optimal policy one, for the three levels of labor productivity. It can be observed
that, for ε1 and ε2 and very low levels of wealth, consumption and leisure are higher in the
benchmark economy, the reason being the higher labor income that poor households enjoy.
When wealth increases the return on capital holdings starts being a relevant source of income for
the household. Since the real interest rate is lower in the benchmark economy, consumption and
leisure decrease. For high productivity households the picture looks diﬀerent. These households
are always enjoying a high level of consumption, and even for very little levels of wealth their
labor income is suﬃciently high to ﬁnance high consumption and savings. The decrease in
uncertainty as a consequence of lower inﬂation levels present in the optimal policy economy
diminishes the incentives to save for precautionary reasons. Therefore, very productive agents
can aﬀord to work less and enjoy higher levels of leisure, even if this means giving up some of
their consumption.
Figure 4 plots the diﬀerence in savings between the benchmark economy and the optimal












































































































policy one. It is immediate to see that, for agents with ε1 and ε2, this diﬀerence is always
negative, thus savings are higher in the optimal policy steady state. For agents with ε3, however,
the contrary statement is true. Again, this result hinges on the fact that high productivity
agents need to save less for self-insurance reasons when R = 1. Agents with low and medium
productivity and very little wealth need to save more because hitting the constraint is more
harmful in this case. Notice that this is the reason why the curve of the diﬀerence in savings
ﬁrst rises and then goes down. As wealth increases, their total income goes up and they are able
to better self-insure by saving more.
Finally, ﬁgure 5 plots the use of the transaction technology in the benchmark economy.
Notice that, unless the borrowing constraint is binding, when R = 1 an agent will not use the
transaction technology because the opportunity cost of holding money is zero30,s ot h ezi policy
function is trivial in the optimal policy economy. If the borrowing constraint is binding, from
inspection of equation (9) it is clear that an agent will use credit, even if R = 1, because doing
so allows her to relax such constraint.
Figure 5 shows that the use of the transaction technology becomes more intensive with
higher wealth holdings. The reason for this lies in the increasing returns to scale nature of the
transaction technology we have adopted. Since higher wealth implies higher consumption for all
30To be precise, agent i will be indiﬀerent between using money or buying up to good ˜ z
i
t with credit, since both
entail zero costs.























Figure 5: Transaction technology use
levels of labor productivity, the unitary cost of credit goes down as wi goes up, so zi goes up
as well. Increasing returns to scale are also responsible for the three lines, corresponding to the
three labor productivity levels, becoming closer together as wealth increases, since for high wi
the diﬀerences in consumption become smaller.
6 Welfare analysis
We proceed to compare aggregate welfare in the benchmark economy (with a level of inﬂation of
2% annually) and in the economy in which the optimal policy is implemented. In this section we
are comparing welfare in two diﬀerent steady states, and we are not saying anything as to what
happens during the transition from one to the other if there is a reform on policy. Obviously,
studying the transition is a very interesting exercise, specially if we want to determine the
“optimal transition”, i.e., the transition such that no agent loses from the policy reform. As
shown by Greulich and Marcet (2008) the optimal transition can imply a policy during the
transition very diﬀerent from the long-run policy prescription. We leave the analysis of the
transition for future research.
We need to start with some deﬁnitions. The overall utilitarian welfare gain of the policy
reform,  U is such that
 









where the superscript B stands for the benchmark economy and O for the economy with the
optimal policy.  U can be thought of as the percent permanent change in consumption that
24Table 4: Welfare gains
 U =0 .0051  lev =0 .0044  unc =0 .0015  ine = −0.00005
agents in economy B should receive to be indiﬀerent between living in economy B or in economy
O.
Notice that the utilitarian social welfare (eq. (7)) can increase for three reasons. The ﬁrst is
when consumption or leisure increase for all agents. This is called the level eﬀect. The second,
called inequality eﬀect, is when inequality is reduced, since u(·) (and therefore V (·)) is concave.
Finally, since agents are risk-averse, if uncertainty is reduced U increases. This is the uncertainty
eﬀect. Following Floden (2001), we can approximately decompose the utilitarian welfare gain
into the welfare gains associated to the three eﬀects mentioned before. In order to do this, deﬁne








ldλ and ¯ C =
 
¯ cdλ average consumption, leisure and certainty-
equivalent consumption, respectively. Then the cost of uncertainty punc can be deﬁned as
V ({(1 − punc)C,Leis}∞
s=t)=V ({ ¯ C,Leis}∞
s=t)
This is the fraction of average consumption that an individual with average consumption
and leisure would be willing to give up to avoid all the risk from labor productivity ﬂuctua-
tions. When uncertainty increases, ¯ C decreases and, since C and Leis remain unchanged, punc
necessarily goes up.
Deﬁne the cost of inequality pine as





If we redistribute consumption from a rich household to a poor one, ¯ C and Leis remain
unchanged. However, the right-hand side of the previous expression increases, so pine has to go
down. Finally, deﬁne leisure-compensated consumption in economy O, ˆ CO as
V ({ ˆ CO,Leis B}∞
s=t)=V ({CO,Leis O}∞
s=t)
which is the average consumption level that would make life-time utility in economy O equal
to the one in an economy with the average leisure of economy B.
We are now ready to deﬁne the welfare gains associated to each one of the eﬀects described
before:


















Table 4 shows the welfare gains in our setup. As we can see, the aggregate utilitarian welfare
gains are very small, only 0.51% of life-time consumption. The majority of these gains are due
to the change in consumption levels (0.44% of consumption), and the remaining is because of
the decrease in uncertainty that is associated with the optimal policy (0.15% of consumption).
The welfare gains associated to the decrease in inequality are, actually, welfare costs, and are
negligible.
We proceed now to compute the individual welfare gains from the change in policy. We
perform the following exercise: we calculate the percentage permanent increase in consumption
 i that we should give to a household i with (wi,ε i) to be indiﬀerent between living in the
benchmark economy B or living in the optimal policy economy O with the same level of labor
productivity and wealth. Figure 6 shows  i as a function of wi and εi.W e c a n s e e f r o m t h e
graph that, although the aggregate welfare gain is small, individual welfare gains and loses can
be very large, depending on an agent’s productivity and wealth holdings. It is by aggregation
that the individual eﬀects cancel out, thus yielding a mild aggregate eﬀect.
From inspection of ﬁgure 6 we can determine who are the net winners and net losers from the
reform. Because of the smaller level of steady state capital in the optimal policy economy, the
wage rate is lower and labor taxes are higher. Then, very poor agents always lose with the change
in policy, irrespective of their labor productivity, the reason being that poor agents rely almost
entirely on their labor income to pay for consumption goods, so changes in labor income matter
substantially for them. The welfare loss amounts to about a 4% of permanent consumption
for low productivity agents, while it is less than 1% for high productivity households. The
diﬀerence in these eﬀects relies on the fact that utility is concave and agents with high ε are
income-rich, so they can aﬀord higher levels of consumption and leisure. On the contrary, net
winners from the policy change are middle-class and rich households, again irrespective of their




















Figure 6: Individual welfare gains
rate. Again, because of the concavity of the utility function, rich and low-productivity agents
are the ones that beneﬁt the more. Their welfare gains can reach a maximum of around 4% of
permanent consumption, while for high-productivity households the maximum is about 2.5%.
7 Conclusions
The determination of the optimal monetary policy prescription in the long run is a crucial issue
for policy makers as well as for academics. Arguably, central banks set their inﬂation targets
according to some criteria related to the maximization of social welfare. The natural question
that arises is what the long-run optimal inﬂation target should be.
The standard literature in optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, by focusing on representa-
tive agent environments, looks into this problem in a partial way and only considers issues of
eﬃciency in distributing the distortions associated to taxation. In this paper we have relaxed
the representative-agent assumption by allowing for heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk. This allows us to include in the analysis issues of redistribution of the tax burden and
long-run eﬀects of diﬀerent tax schemes over capital and output that cannot be addressed in the
traditional framework.
We make the standard modeling assumption that agents demand cash because it provides
liquidity services. Moreover, we allow them to use an alternative costly transaction technology
by which they economize on their money holdings. This transaction technology reconciles the
model with some stylized facts reported in the literature regarding transaction patterns for
diﬀerent sectors of population. We are able to identify the eﬀects of inﬂation as a regressive tax
27on consumption and as a motive to increase savings for precautionary reasons.
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and ﬁnd that the optimal policy prescription
that arises from the exercise is the Friedman rule. This result provides robustness to what is a
classical result in representative-agent models. A surprising implication of the analysis is that,
despite the fact that inﬂation taxes relatively more consumption of poor agents, these agents
actually win with inﬂation, while middle-class and rich agents lose. Therefore, this analysis
challenges the conventional wisdom that inﬂation hurts the poor and beneﬁts the rich.
The analysis presented here opens many avenues for future research. Probably one of the
most natural extensions is the study of the transition between the steady state with the bench-
mark policy and the one in which the optimal policy is implemented. Studying the transition
allows to perform a more accurate analysis of the welfare gains from the change in policy for
diﬀerent individuals. Moreover, studying the optimal transition, i.e., the transition taking into
account that all agents should beneﬁt from the reform, can lead to policy plans very diﬀerent
than what is optimal in the long run, as is shown in Greulich and Marcet (2008).
On a related note, Doepke and Schneider (2006) have driven attention to the fact that
unexpected inﬂation can have large redistributive eﬀects for individuals with diﬀerent portfolio
holdings. As a further step, we would like to introduce aggregate ﬂuctuations to a framework
similar in spirit to the one we consider here, but taking into account this heterogeneity of
portfolio holdings among diﬀerent individuals. This type of environment is suitable for studying
optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy as stabilizing mechanisms for macroeconomic ﬂuctuations,
an issue that has not been addressed in this paper.
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30A Appendix
A.1 Optimality conditions of the household



































We can rewrite equations (15) and (16) in real terms by diving both sides of the equations
by pt:
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w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a t
pt
pt−1 =1 +Π ,qt = ωpt and R =( 1 +˜ r)(1+Π). ˜ r = r(1−τk)
is the after-tax real return on capital.
Plugging equation (19) into (18), using wi
t = ai
t + mi
t and rearranging, we obtain
ci
t(1 − (1 − zi





t+1 =( 1+˜ r)wi
t +( 1− τl)ω(1 − li
t)εi
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t ≤ 0 (21)
The problem of the household becomes maximizing (14) subject to constraints (20) and (21).





















along with the Euler equation. Call μt the multiplier associated to constraint (21). If the








If, on the contrary, μt+1 > 0 the Euler equation becomes
uc,t
Γt















Given that equation (21) can be binding in t and/or in t + 1, 4 possible cases need to be
considered when solving for the allocations of agent i:
• μt =0a n dμt+1 = 0. The relevant equations for obtaining the allocations are (22), (23),
(24) and the budget constraint (20).
• μt > 0a n dμt+1 = 0. The relevant equations for obtaining the allocations are (21), (23),
(24) and the budget constraint (20).
• μt =0a n dμt+1 > 0. The relevant equations for obtaining the allocations are (22), (23),
(25) and the budget constraint (20).
• μt > 0a n dμt+1 > 0. The relevant equations for obtaining the allocations are (21), (23),
(25) and the budget constraint (20).
32A.2 Optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy with constant heterogeneity and no
idiosyncratic risk
As in section 3.1, assume that an agent’s productivity εi is constant ∀t, εi ∈ E =[ ε1,ε 2]w i t h
ε1 <ε 2 and there is an equal mass of each type of agent in the population 31.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
assume for simplicity that the initial wealth holdings w1
0 and w2
0 are such that the economy is
in steady state from t =0o n w a r d s .
Consider the case of a benevolent government (a Ramsey planner) that has to decide on the
level of R and τl in our economy, in order to maximize a social welfare function given by the
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where K = K1 +K2, Lg = Lg,1 +Lg,2 and ψi is the Pareto weight that the Ramsey planner
assigns an agent of type i.
Equations (26), (27) and (28) correspond to the implementability constraints and resource
constraints respectively. Notice that, when there is more than one type of agent in the economy,
we need to consider one implementability constraint for each type of household32.
31The results of this section are robust to changes in the number of productivity states and in the composition
of the population.
32By virtue of Walras’ Law, the budget constraint of the government is automatically satisﬁed.




































































We assume that the tax system is anonymous, in the sense that the tax rates on labor τl
and τk are not agent-speciﬁc. τk is exogenously imposed at a certain level for all individuals.
Equation (30) imposes the condition that τl is equal for both types of households33. Finally,
given that the gross nominal interest rate R has to be the the same across individuals, equation
(29) needs to be imposed.
In this case, the solution to the Ramsey problem varies with the determination of ˜ zi and
with the Pareto weight ψi that corresponds to each type of agent. Consider ﬁrst the case in
which ˜ zi =˜ z for i =1 ,2. Our numerical exercise yields the following result:
Result 2. In the heterogeneous-agent case with no idiosyncratic uncertainty and ˜ zi =˜ z for
i =1 ,2, the Friedman rule is optimal for all possible Pareto weights ψ1,ψ2 ∈ [0,1].
The intuition for the result lies in the uniform taxation argument explained in the main text
of the paper. When we allow ˜ zi = f(εi) the optimal policy prescription varies depending on the
Pareto weights we consider, as summarized below:
Result 3. Assume ˜ zi = f(εi) and ∂˜ zi
εi > 0, so that ˜ z1 < ˜ z2. Then, for a high enough Pareto
weight on the more productive agents, ψ2, the planner deviates from the Friedman rule and sets
R>1.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate what is stated in results 2 and 3. These ﬁgures show the utilities
of the two types of agents for R ∈ [1,1.05] for the cases in which ˜ zi =0f o ri =1 ,2a n d
33To see why this equation implies that τl should be equal across individuals, notice that the optimality
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˜ z2 =0 .2 > ˜ z1 = 0, respectively. As we can see, in the ﬁrst case the utility of both agents
is decreasing in R, while in the second case the utility of agents with ε2 is humped-shaped,
increasing ﬁrst with R, reaching a maximum and then decreasing for higher values of the nominal
interest rate. The behavior of this utility causes the utility of the planner to be humped-shaped
as well, provided that the weight on agents with ε2 is high enough.





1+( 1− zi)(R − 1)
(31)
Now assume that ˜ z2 is large, that ψ2 → 1a n dψ1 → 0. In this case the denominator of the
right hand side of expression (31) will be close to 1, even if R is very large. Since the planner
cares only about agent 2, it wants to distort as little as possible the intratemporal decision
of agent 2, therefore it wants the wedge between the marginal utility of leisure and that of
consumption to be as close to one as possible. From expression (31) it is clear that the way to
achieve this is to set τl as low as possible while relying heavily on seigniorage revenues to ﬁnance
its budget. Since agents with ε2 can shelter from inﬂation by recurring to credit, this is clearly
optimal.
A.3 Computational algorithm
As explained in the main text, the model depicted here cannot be solved analytically. Conse-
quently, we need to use numerical tools in order to obtain a solution.
The problem of the household includes a borrowing constraint, which is occasionally binding
constraint. This constraint translates into strong non-linearities in the policy functions of the
35household. Since we are interested in computing welfare gains and loses at the individual level,
we should compute these policy functions accurately. Thus, we choose not to use perturbation
techniques but, instead, implement a collocation algorithm to obtain such functions.
The solution algorithm is as follows:
1. Deﬁne a grid for wi
t.
2. Set an initial guess for the real interest rate rg and an initial guess for the vector of
parameters Ωg that we want to calibrate.




t)   ˜ f(wi
t,ε i
t,Λ)
We approximate the policy function with linear splines and discretize the state space using
80 grid points. We solve for Λ by collocation, which implies that we need to ﬁnd Λ such
that the Euler equation (24)-(25) is satisﬁed at every (wi
t,ε i
t) in our grid. Therefore, we
obtain a system of non-linear equations that we solve through a successive approximations
strategy.
4. Simulate the economy for 5000 ex-ante identical individuals, for 700 periods in order to
obtain an invariant distribution.





6. If rf = rg stop, otherwise update rg and iterate on 3-5 until convergence.
7. Compute the desired moments from the model, if they coincide with the targets from the
data, stop, otherwise update Ωg and iterate on 3-6 until convergence.
8. Repeat 2-7 for a ﬁne grid of R, compute welfare and choose R such that social welfare is
maximized.
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